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Graduated at West Point in 1938 after Engineering Course. The Academy gave a 3 months leave after graduation & he went to Germany in the Summer of 1938 for 2 months, where he was an exchange student at Heidelberg Univ for 6 weeks. He reported to his first assignment at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii. He returned to the States & went to Ft Benning then to Ft. Jackson. He was in the Artillery & in Aug. 1941, he was promoted to Capt & made S3 (operations officer) for an Engineer Bn. He then went on the Carolina & Tern transporters. In the Spring of '42 he was promoted to Major & became C.O. of the 56th FA Bn. They went to the desert for intensive training under battle conditions. They stayed in the desert 6 mos. They spent 4 or 5 mos at Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo. by going to the desert. After the desert they went to Camp Forest staging area. In Dec. 1943 the Bn went overseas & to Ireland. He was a Lt-Col since the Spring of '43. After more training in Ir. they went into action on July 4, 1944 across the beaches of Normandy, & remained in action until V E Day in E. He was decorated several times, including a nice citation & we want copies of all of these. The unit was on the Baltic Sea on V E Day. The sailer from Le Havre & reached the States on or about 14 July 1945 & went to Ft. Leonard Wood to prepare to go to Japan. At V J Day the Division was disbanded & John went to the Pentagon & spoke to his friends, about being assigned to the technical or scientific field. He felt that the atomic weapons what have to be handled by the Army, as the Air Corp had bombed our own forces & would continue to do the same thing.

Tactical air support was a daily thing & your troops' chances are about 1 in 5 of being hit by your own Air Support. This is more serious with Atomic bombs.

Artillery hits its own troops but the % is about 1 in 1000.

The Army is shooting for an average of about 1 in 10,000.

John felt that with the new weapons Artillery must do this job rather than the Air Corps



While at the Pentagon he got the assignment at the JPL at Cal. Inst. of Tech. at Pasadena Cal. He got a M.A. degree in Aeronautics (jet propulsion). This gets us to 1947

A rocket is a form of propulsion. A guided missile is anything that can be controlled after it leaves the launcher.

J.P.L. was the leader in the rocket field. John saw the first firing at White Sands in 1945 + 1947.

He went from J.P.L. to the Com + Gen Staff College for a year. He was in the upper 10 of his class of 400.

He then went to the Special Weapons Assignment at Aberdeen, D.M., which was a liaison team between the Army + the Atomic Energy Com. John did a lot of research work here in adapting atomic warheads to missiles.

He also was doing a lot of coordination work by managing the defense dept., the Atomic Energy Com, Cal. Tech, etc.

The Corporal, developed by JPL, + info by Frisstone, is the only missile we now have in the field with an atomic warhead. <sup>Its range is about 85 miles.</sup>

When the troops went into Korea the only way an atomic bomb or weapon could be delivered was by the Air Corp.

John wanted the Army to be able to control this, so as to avoid our own troops being hit.

On his own initiative he worked out the Safety + Degr. Ratio, that has been adopted by all 3 services.

Col. James Bain knows that John worked this out. Bain is still on his same job at White Sands.

The politics of the thing is that the Air Corp does not want anybody to have access to atomic weapons except the Air Force. The AF takes the position well drop your bombs for you wherever you need it.

John got up a paper on Honest John + took it to the Pentagon



He took it to a Col Pecca who was in Lt-Gen Michelson's AAA Command. Michelson listened to it but wasn't too enthusiastic as he felt it was too inaccurate. Pecca told John that they had an opening in the atomic section of Michelson's Hq. & for him to take it. John did. The first John was not getting along too well & Pecca told John that what it needed was for someone to push it, John said he was going to push it. He arranged for some test firings to show the grouping of its hits, its accuracy, & Michelson became sold on it, so they sold it thru the Joint Chiefs of Staff & the Army got a rocket with an atomic warhead. This weapon is now in the field in Europe & with troops. A Gen. Hertford, Army, had been at White Sands & he and John had differed about the Army's role in this. Hertford wanted to give the Army's weapons to the Air Force. Hertford had never had any combat experience. When Michelson moved out of the AAA Command, Hertford was assigned to succeed him & John found himself working under a man he differed with greatly. He then went to Ordnance & talked to Toftoy & asked to be transferred to Ordnance & he was. About this same time 1952, Toftoy is assigned to Redstone. The Redstone missile was then in the making. Hertford told the Chiefs of Staff that the Army did not need a 200 mile missile.

The Thermo-Nuclear warhead had just come out and was considered the thing. Redstone was the only weapon that the Army had that was capable of carrying this T-N warhead & Hertford could no longer back the program.

Gen Simon, <sup>(now Ret)</sup> was chief of Research & Development in the Ordnance Corp. & he followed John's thinking. In the Fall of 1954, Hertford was still hostile to the Redstone & cutting back on the funds available. Simon



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took the position that since the funds were being cut, there would have to be reductions at Redstone Arsenal. Some of the key people were leaving the V.B. team. Most of the Army Rocket-Missile advocates in D.C. had retired or reassigned & John was almost alone in the Pentagon in pushing the Army's program.

V.B.'s firings at the proving grounds clearly proved to be the most successful, so they felt they must find more work & get more funds for this team or lose it.

This is when the Satellite entered the field.

On Dec. 5, 1954 there was a meeting in the office of Naval Research. V.B. & Stuhlinger was there from R/S, John was there representing Simon's office. Many leading space scientists were there & they decided that the program was worth while & wanted John to help carry the ball. John was not sold on it being worth the Govt's money. John was convinced the V.B. could put it up there, when he said he could. John then talked to lots of astronomers & scientists about the benefits of this sphere being out there. John became sold because of its propaganda value to the Army as it would be a major "first." He sold Gen. Simon on it & they offered to join with the Navy, who would make up the sphere & the Army would put it out there.

Dr. Orin Rosen a navy-man comes forward & says they can take the Viking & revamp it & get the sphere out there better & quicker than the Army can. I.E., they outpromised the Army. The Committee voted 5 to 3 to give the entire program to the Navy. Quarles was asst. secty of Defense for R+D & he still was not sold that the Navy could put it out there, & he asked for a statement as to whether the Redstone would be it out there.



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John came to R/S + worked several days with VB + went back + reported to Quarles, who called another committee meeting + again the Army was outvoted.

The Navy promised to launch the 1st satellite in Jan 1957. Now the Gen. Martin tells the Navy it will be late 1958 before it can hope to launch it.

The Army realized they had lost it once for all + was terribly disappointed.

The President had approved the satellite program + said we'd fire it by 1958. The actual chances vs this being done is about 2 to 1.

The V.B. Team continued to work on further development of the Redstone Rocket as a forerunner of the Jupiter. The J-27 was a so-called R/S that was built to fire in 4 stages. Direct orders were given from top-side not to fire the 4 stages but only fire 3 stages + this was done in the Sept 1956 firing of the J-27. They have a J-29 ready for a 4 stage firing, but the authorities won't let them fire it as they say it will compete with the Navy satellite program.

A Scientific Committee on the Future of Warfare, called the Kielian Committee, was an advisory committee to the President of the US. It felt that the Strategic Air Force would ultimately be replaced by the I.R.B.M. The Army then started on a 1000 mi missile.

Dr. Quarles, while still asst Secy of Defense, was brought to R/S + shown about. He became sold on the work being done on the VB team + told them to forget the 1000 mi missile + go to work on a 1500 mi I.R.B.M. He made a study on it + report back to him. This was June 1955.

Hertford had opposed the 200 mi missile + he turned thumbs down on the 1500 mi. John went to Gen. Savin who was then Deputy Ch of Staff for Plans + he called Hertford + reported to Savin. John told Savin that Hertford was giving away the Army's future in rockets + missiles. Savin called Hertford + Simon in + told them the Army should stay in the I.R.B.M. field. About a mo. later Hertford retired + was succeeded by Mera his asst.



About this time Stevens went out as Secty of the Army & Brucker came in. Wilson asked all the chiefs to submit their needs for an I.R.B.M. Brucker + Sargin came to Redstone & became sold. Adm. Arleigh Burke promised to vote for the Army in use of the I.R.B.M. When the show-down came he reneged & voted for the Air Force as the only one that really needed I.R.B.M.

It was generally known that the VB team was the best qualified & Dr. Brucker stood his ground, so the Defense Dept. said to let the Army go ahead & in order to placate the Air Force, who was very powerful, they were given the Thor. ABMA was conceived in Nov. 1955 & Madaris was designated to head it. VB was taken from R/S and assigned to ABMA when it was activated in Feb. 1956. John moved to R/S on Jan 20, 1956. John had to work the liaison with the Navy, who was to use the same I.R.B.M. as the Army. Madaris disliked the Navy.

The Navy never was happy with this shot-gun marriage & they wanted out and have their own programs. The Navy also was favoring a solid propellant, whereas the Army knew that liquid propellants was 5 years ahead of solids.

The inertial guiding system was a field the VB team was far ahead in. The Navy's launching problems was greater than the Army's & the Navy's? this guided system as being suited to their needs. The Army could not go along with 2 guiding systems as they didn't have the money or technical ability.

John + VB felt they should try to go along with the Navy's desires to keep from losing the Navy. Madaris didn't want to go along but John + VB finally sold him on the idea. The? then arose over the missile being too large for ship use & Madaris raised hell about reducing its diameter but John + VB again sold Madaris on going along with the Navy's request & he did!



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All of this pleased the rank + file of the Navy, but some of the top men were still unhappy with this working with the Army on this program. These Top men of the Navy won out and sold Mr. <sup>+ the JC of St.</sup> ~~Quarles~~ that the Navy should pull out on their own, + the Army should remain in the I.R.B.M. field only so far as it assists the Navy. Mr. Wilson had a meeting with all the Sectys present + Mr. Brucker told Wilson the Army could not be denied this weapon as the Navy was dependant on it. Secty Thos of the Navy spoke up + said the Navy did not need anything from the Army.

Brucker said he was mad + hurt, and he called J and told him he wanted a report on why the J was superior to the Thor. This was the — — —, + was in strong language. This was in Nov. 1956. John had authority from Medaris to go anywhere, anytime, to see anybody regarding this program.

John, as head of The Field Coordination Office (this was likely the first time in the history of the U.S. Army that such a title was held) was told by Medaris on several occasions that he was his Secty of State. His work for a long time had been in the political field. His office also took colored 16 mm film + gave a monthly briefing to Top-officers in the Pentagon.

A job assigned to J was to ascertain what — know about our plans + progress. Another was to learn what was in the mind politically, + to keep the Secty informed by these things happen.

In the Nose Cone problems, John was made chairman of the Committee that worked out the type now used on the Jupiter. Medaris told John at one stage, right after his return from his operations, that he wanted him to be head of the R + D Section, if even on a subrosa basis.

The TV sending unit on each missile to report back when the missile landed was important + John worked with Bauman of R.C.A. on this.

John had seen Medaris look at the Wilson Memo came out + knew M's attitude on the entire program.

The material that went to Pearson's office consisted solely of 2 things: (1st) The Wilson Memo, which was not



classified (2d) John's Consideration of the Wilson Memo, which John wrote & which he did not consider classified and he had the authority to say whether a paper or document is or isn't classified.