





(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Nov 24, 1956

N visited Brucker before the Wilson memo came out, to see if the memo could be stopped if it could not be stopped what steps should be taken to get reconsideration.

It was N's visit to Brucker that actually brought the Army IG to Redstone in mass.

N actually reproduced 25 copies + later 15 copies or 40 of the combined documents.

On Dec. 3, 1956, Gen. Madala called a Staff meeting at which he told the group that they were going to stress the ability of this team to do a job & avoid Rola + Missions - There were Air Force + Navy People present at this meeting. N does not recall being present, but one of the staff reported to him what happened.

When N returned to Hill from Da. on Nov. 25, 1956 he saw John Sparkman at the RSE + told him the Wilson memo would likely be out the next day - John's wife Dr. Wilson + the President. The next day, on Nov. 26<sup>th</sup> the Wilson memo came out.

N says he never took literally what Gen. M. said before a staff meeting where the Navy + AF were present. He had many meetings with just him + Gen. M. when they talked + planned. N says he had learned that when M. said certain things when the Navy + AF was present, he would go back see Gen. M. privately + get exactly what he meant or wanted. N knew that some things said at these staff meetings with Navy + AF present could not be taken literally.

Shortly after Gen. M.'s Dec. 3<sup>rd</sup> Staff meeting, N went to see the Gen. + told him that the AF would never buy the Army's missile - N told M. we have got to hang on by our teeth + in the meantime try to regain the Rola + Missions. M. told N that he would have to be careful as he did not want R + M taken up in such fashion that it would get to the AF because if it did it would hurt the Army's chance of selling the Jupiter to the AF.

Shortly thereafter a telegram was received from the Raymond Woldridge Co.



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Who was doing some work for the A7, that they wanted to come to Redstone  
I went to Sen. M. + ~~he~~ said this is a hotchpot job + if these guys come  
down they'd recommend scrapping the Jupiter program. M. said  
we don't want those clowns down here + he called Brucker  
who went to Wilson + had this visit stopped.

After the middle of Dec, M. was beginning to get blue over  
the whole program + realized that they could never work with  
the A7. I went to M's office on or about Dec 15<sup>th</sup>  
and Sen. Barclay was present + M. said that anyone  
who wants to take action in this area does so on  
his own responsibility. It was here that M. rubbed his  
hands + smiled + M. smiled back.

M. had operated on his own before in such areas, + felt he  
had the green light.

The Dept. of the Army I G Report contains many statements that don't tell the  
whole story. Many witnesses were rogues and apparently were  
trying to protect Brucker, Taylor, Sartin + M.

By the time the 3d Army I. G. got into the picture, lots  
of brainwashing days orders had taken place + the  
witnesses forgot about Brucker, Taylor + Sartin + it appears  
they were out to get Nickerson.

In the D.A. I G Report - Jas; states he assumed M. wrote the "inside",  
that he assumed it was unclassified + that he never read it.

James stated under oath that he did not contact Pearson or Anderson.  
Jas; stated that when he contacted Pearson, I said it was old stuff he couldn't use it.



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Jas. to the D.H.I.G. that he took 3 copies to Wash, D.C. & brought 3 copies back. He later stated he had withheld information & said he carried 4 copies to D.C.; that Congress was not in session; & that he never read it; & that the only name that came to his mind was Drew Pearson. He says he did not call Pearson but mailed a copy to Pearson.

He puts in a good word for D. by saying D. was honest & acted in the best interest of the Army.

He stated he did not like the political aspect of the ~~the~~ Coordination Office and wanted to get out of it. Jas. says it was only because D. was a strong-willed person that he did what he did. He does not recall D. telling them that anything anybody did, they did it on their own.

He said D. held a lot of policy meetings with D.

Jas. finally admits that he was the first person to mention the name of Drew Pearson.

Weisman admits setting up the Sparkman meeting at the R/E.

Weisman also admits giving a copy to Hunt of Reynolds' notes.



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Dr. Stuhlinger says rockets are more accurate than artillery.

He says they are accurate to  $1/10$  of 1%.

He is a physicist & studied under Dr. Siegel (<sup>of</sup> Pieper Counter Force) & joined Peenemunde in 1943, where they perfected the world's first guided missile to be used as a weapon.

He came to the U.S. in 1946 as a member of the V2 team & went to Ft. Bliss for 4 years.

For 1950 they came to Redstone. In 1951 the team was assigned the Redstone missile.

It is now a proven missile & weapon & carries a heavier warhead than artillery can carry. After the Redstone missile the team was assigned the Jupiter, to

have a longer range and a lighter warhead. The Jupiter was assigned in the Fall of 1955.

He first heard of Col. N. <sup>in 1954</sup> as a man in the Army who was more courageous in speaking out for Army missile programs. When he first met N. <sup>in Dec. 1954</sup> he knew what he had heard of him was correct.

The team was working feverish as the Russians were ahead of us in 1955. He knows the Russians had an 800 mile missile but Jupiter was begun.

The missile is very important because it is the only weapon vs which there are no counter weapons.

The Nike is a ground-to-air missile & if we have enough of them we could prevent planes from getting in to us.

The missile is far more essential, effective, & superior to planes.

The Jupiter is a ground-to-ground missile & the Army needs it.

He says V2, Gen. M. & J.C.A. are the 3 most active men in the Jupiter program.

He says N. is a hard-worker & very essential to the team. The team needs

N. & he hopes N. will be returned to the team.

JE says time is of great importance in this race.

The Jupiter C fired in Sept 1956 went 600 mi high & traveled 3000 miles. It set 4 world records & was 100% successful. This was not a weapon missile.

The results of this firing appeared in the newspapers but Stuhlinger et al were not



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permitted to say anything about it. From the data in the newspaper, any good team of scientists could deduct all the material facts about it. He feels that the Jupiter firing in early March 1956 was 60% successful. He says the malfunction was a good thing.

The team is far on the way to having a workable IRBM in the Jupiter.

The work that has been accomplished could not have been except for the experience + common working + thinking of the TB team.

The TB team is best qualified to do the IRBM. If this was assigned to the AF, who has no team, as such, it would delay the program considerably.

When it first heard that the Wilson memo would come out, in a staff meeting with TB, the team was shocked and couldn't believe it, as it was all so unreasonable. They did not believe it at first, because there was no logical technical or scientific reason for the abandonment of the Jupiter. The news was depressing, not only to the team, but to all the brass, all of Hqs and all the Army.

The impact on JCN was great as he had worked so hard on this project. Gen M. had several conferences after the memo came out + at these Gen M.

gave some hope that both the Rocket Missions + the Research + Development could be retained by ABMA. Except for the optimism of TB, Gen M. + JCN, he feels the impact of the Wilson memo, would have resulted in the immediate break-up of the team.

There was a staff meeting at which Gen Gurni was present + Gurni too was very optimistic + he vertiable gave us the assurance and a promise that the choice between Jupiter & Thor would be made on the merits of the two missiles by the end of 1957.

The real test of classification is how much would it help the enemy. Document 172 (which dealt with the Sept 1956 test flight of Jupiter C) contained data that



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had appeared in newspaper. The design of this missile should not have been classified as plan of boosters to missiles is known by missilemen around the world. The data in 172 could have been of no comfort to the enemy. If he (Stuhlinger) had been on the Russian team & saw the 172 document, he would have said it had no value or secrets, but would have been read with interest.

172 did not aid any ~~to~~ enemy, or harm the U.S. It is only charged ~~to~~ with giving this to Bergquist & S says if it was given to world it would not have hurt the U.S.

Document 63 (conico-lock) was written by Dr. Sampson <sup>JPH</sup> & he told Stuhlinger in Oct. of 1956, that this document should not have been classified as it should be discussed in scientific meetings, etc.

On Nov. 14, 1956 this document was published in the JPH Report & was not marked classified. The unclassified version actually had more information in it than the classified version.

He feels Russia was as far advanced along this line as we were.

The general publication of this document could not have helped Russia or hurt the U.S.

Document 68 (Upper Stages of the Rocket) is about the same. It contained no new data.

The Army & Navy both got interested in the Satellite & both submitted a proposal. VB & JCN submitted the Army plan & the Navy proved to be the better promoter & got the assignment.

The Navy's proposal did not consist of any of the proponents of the Army's proposal, which was built around the Redstone missile in the launching of the Satellite, & the Redstone was a proven missile.

This thing of putting up the first satellite was an important world first. The decision to give this to the Navy will definitely make the Russians



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first in the satellite field, as the Russians ~~to~~ announced in Rome in October 1956 <sup>at the International Astronautical Congress</sup> that they would fire their first satellite in 1957. The Navy promised to fire their first satellite in Jan 1957 and it was to be launch by their Vanguard. The Vanguard hasn't even been developed as yet.

He says Chrysler, Reynolds Metals et al must plan ahead and need to know about these things.

At the Rome meeting in Oct 1956, The Navy described in detail, with 3 Russians present, the Vanguard, which contained far more advance data than anything contained in the Consideration Memo, according to Dr. Stuhlinger - He can name the 3 Russians: